Chapter 3 of Political Liberalism

 

Chapter 3 of John Rawls' "Political Liberalism" explores the idea of a "freestanding" political conception of justice. Rawls underscores that this conception should be independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, and should instead be based on a shared political idea of justice that all citizens can reasonably accept. He further underlines that this idea must be formulated in a way that is compatible with a diverse and pluralistic society, and should provide a basis for public reason and political cooperation among citizens. Rawls also asserts that a political conception of justice should include basic liberties and rights, and should be structured in a way that enables citizens to pursue their own goals and values while respecting the rights and liberties of others. Rawls' aim in this chapter is to provide a framework for a just and stable political order that can be acceptable to all citizens, regardless of their comprehensive beliefs or worldviews. One of the concerns of Rawls that can be observed in this chapter is that social and political minorities are not discriminated against by the will and concerns of the majority, and that the minorities have as much liberties and rights as the majority communities do. 

Chapter 4 is here. 

Chapter 2 of Rawls' Political Liberalism

This is a summarisation of chapter 2 of Rawls' Political Liberalism.

Chapter 2 of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism discusses the concept of a political conception of justice, and how it differs from comprehensive moral doctrine. Rawls argues that a political conception is limited to the basic structure of society and focuses on principles that can be reasonably acceptable to citizens who have different comprehensive views. Given that comprehensive views have scope so large that they extend far beyond the political conception, he avoids using comprehensive moral doctrine. Critics have underlined that in his A Theory of Justice, he had employed a comprehensive moral doctrine. To rectify this point, he was careful to avoid that the political conception that he attempts to arrive at is rather limited one in term of the scope that it covers. He also discusses the idea of an overlapping consensus where citizens can come to agree on certain principles of justice even if they have different comprehensive beliefs. Rawls concludes the chapter by stating that a political conception of justice should aim to ensure basic liberties and equality of basic rights and opportunities, while respecting the diversity of citizens’ comprehensive beliefs. 

Chapter 3 is here. 

Chapter 1 of John Rawls' Political Liberalism

Chapter 1 of Rawl's Political Liberalism introduces Rawls' main idea, which is to present a political conception of justice that can serve as a basis for a just and a stable society of free and equal citizens, even in a situation where people of various comprehensive philosophical, religious and moral doctrines live together. 

Rawls argues that such a political conception should not rely on any specific comprehensive worldview, but rather should be grounded in a shared public values and principles that can be reasonably justified to all citizens. He also introduces the idea of the original position, a hypothetical political circumstance in which citizens are made to choose principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance, a situation that denies the citizens knowledge of their social, economic and natural traits. The reason for positioning the citizens behind such a veil is to prevent them from being bias in arriving at the principles that would then serve as a guiding 'north star' for their social lives. This hypothetical political circumstance is then employed to derive the two principles of justice that Rawls claimed are most reasonable and just: the first principle of equal basic liberties, and the second principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. 

A few sentences about the difference principle. 

The difference principle states that, in a society, social and economic inequalities are just if and only if they are arranged to benefit the least advantaged members of society as well. In other words, Rawls argues that inequalities in wealth, income, and social status are acceptable only if they are arranged in such a way as to work to the advantage of the people who are worst off. Rawls argues that this principle is necessary to ensure that the basic rights and liberties of all citizens are protected, and to ensure that the least advantaged members of society are not left behind. The difference principle is meant to be combined with the principle of fair equality of opportunity, which states that all citizens should have an equal chance to achieve positions of social and economic advantage, regardless of their background. Rawls argues that these two principles, when combined, provide a framework for a just and equal society.

Chapter 2 is here. 

Rawl's Primary Goods

Rawls writes about primary goods in section 11, titled 'two principles of justice' in book A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971). He says that primary goods are '"things that every rational man is presumed to want" ( p. 62). He classifies primary goods into two categories: Social Primary Goods and Natural Primary Goods. 

Social Primary Goods include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth ( and self-respect) whereas Natural Primary Goods include health and vigor, intelligence and imagination ( p. 62). 

Whatever kinds of plan of life that a person has, these goods normally are useful for the person to achieve his or her end.