Showing posts with label Moral Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Moral Philosophy. Show all posts

Monday, August 3, 2020

Christian Ethics vis-a-vis Political Ethics in light of Already & Not-Yet Eschatological Tension

If one reads the Bible, there is no doubt that the Bible does not condone adultery; it is considered a sin. There is also no doubt that the Bible does not condone fornication, whether it is between individuals of same sex or between individuals of different  sexes. There is also no doubt that the Bible does not condone sex between individuals of same sex. Lest, someone says Bible only prohibits, let me also state that the Bible considers marriage (and sex within marriage) as honourable. 

Frequently we come across individuals who believe that because the Bible considers these mentioned activities as wrongdoing or sin, these activities must also be criminalised. Meaning, these activities must be banned by the state, which implies that whoever does such things must be caught and appropriate punishment be given (by the state). Is this thinking quite correct? Just because Christians believe certain action to be wrong or sinful, must that action be criminalised? When I eat pork, which the Muslim considers as sin, should I be handed over to the police? When I eat beef, which is anathema for Hindus, should I be handed over to the police? Not really! Well, the point is that we need to differentiate between sin and crime. 

In a liberal democratic society, just because one religious community considers an action as sin, the state cannot just come in and take action against the sinner. If the society is an Islamic society, eating pork may be a sin as well as a crime. In such a society what is a crime or not may be defined according to the teaching of the Quran. However, in a liberal democratic society, no religious texts should really define what is a crime or not. There has to be something more. There may be an overlap between a sin and a crime. So raping someone may be a sin as well as a crime; so also may be stealing, killing etc., but not eating pork, eating beef etc. Eating pork or eating beef may be a sin for someone but they should not be criminalised. The state must determine what is a crime depending on the sentiment of one religious community while undermining the sentiment and the liberty of other religious communities. This is an important feature of a liberal democracy. Similarly, for fornication, adultery or homosexual act, just because the Bible is against such activities, we cannot ask the state to criminalise the acts. If we are to seek criminalisation of these activities, we have to be able to provide other reason beside appealing to the teaching of the Bible. If we don't do that, the Hindus will seek to criminalise beef consumption based on their belief; so will Muslims seek to criminalise pork consumption based on their belief. And when they do that, we would have no good reason to argue against their effort. 

This kind of reasoning will be appreciated more easily by those who belong to the religious minority in a particular situation. A member of the religious majority may not appreciate this kind of reasoning because they know that they will never bear the brunt of such a policy. This is the reason why many members of the religious majority dislike liberal democracy. 

In the past, many countries would write their laws reflecting the religious nature of the majority of the people.  Things began to change in the 17th century. There are different reasons for that, which I am not going to get into now in this post. Now with people migrating back and forth, and therefore the religious composition of a state/country having become more diverse, being a Christian/Buddhist/Islamic country is becoming more problematic. We still see many Muslim majority states/countries having Sharia law in place. However, even with these states, the tension will get worse and worse, because as more and more people from these states travel abroad, they learn from others; plus, as more and more people from other countries come to their country, they find that there are many people who have a different way of living. Moreover, with social medias like Facebook and Youtube becoming so common, learning both bad and good things about others began to take place, and they influence our way of living. So today the question is whether these Muslim states will open up gradually and accept multiculturalism or they will close their doors because they found other cultures polluting their way of life. 


In the biblical scheme of things, readers realise that though God's kingdom of earth is inaugurated through the dead and risen of Jesus Christ, the consummation of his kingdom is awaited. We are now living in between the tension where the kingdom is already come but not yet fully realised. In this period, people are given the choice to accept or reject Jesus Christ; it is the time when both the wheat and the weed grow together. Therefore, for the Christian to force people not to commit sin through state's legislation is not the right approach to call people to live a life of holiness. God gives choice; and we have no business threatening people with imprisonment if they live an adulterous life. I may persuade a friend or even a stranger not to live an adulterous life; however, it is a different matter if the state criminalises and sends an adulterer to jail. In similar vein, Hindus or Muslims persuading me not to eat pork or beef is okay; but it is a different matter if I were sent to jail for eating pork or beef. Spending much energy and money seeking a legislation that will criminalise activities that I consider as sin, which others don't, is not the way to do public theology for a Christian. The more appropriate approach is to share the message of Jesus Christ to a person who may be living a life that I consider as immoral, and when this persons accepts Jesus Christ as Lord and God, he or she will submit to the ways of Jesus Christ. 

NB: While discussing about sexual behaviour, it is important to make a distinction between criminalisation and legalisation. To criminalise an act is to say that if an act is performed, the one performing the act will be imprisoned or treated as an offender in the eyes of the law. When one argues that an act should not be a criminal act, it does not mean the act is praiseworthy or honourable. So when one says that adultery should not be a criminal act, it does not mean that the state should praise or honour adultery. In similar vein, when one argues that homosexual act should not be criminalised, that does not  necessarily mean that same sex marriage should be legally accepted. In the post, I argue that sexual behavior like fornication, adultery and homosexual act should not be criminalised; I am not saying that the state should honour these activities. In effect, I am not saying that same sex marriage should be legally accepted. 

Saturday, April 16, 2016

Is Gay Right a Human Right Issue?

Is gay right is a human right? Someone argued here that gay right is a human right issue. He argued that since it is a human right issue, it should be decriminalised. I agree that it should be decriminalised, but I disagree with the reason provided for why it should be decriminalised. 

Human rights are rights that each person possesses by virtue of being a human person, and violating human right amounts to dehumanising the person. If a person is forced to have sex against her or his consent, that can be a violation of her or his human rights. But if a person is not allowed to have sex, will that be a violation of her or his human right? Or if I put it in a slightly different way: if a person chooses to restrain from sex, would she or he be violating her or his human rights? I would answer the latter question in negative; celibacy is not a violation of one's human rights. I shall come back to the former question later. 

But one may argue that there is a difference between choosing to remain single and being forced to remain single. After all, there is a difference between choosing to fast voluntarily and being forced to starve. If I choose to fast voluntarily, that is not a violation of human right; but if I was forcefully starved, that would be a violation of human right. Now is this analogy quite right? Is state's position -- or rather lack of it -- in not positively legitimising gay sex akin to not positively providing food where and when there is starvation? I think there is a difference. No one can survive without food; one can live well without expression of homosexual activity or heterosexual activity. But one may still argue that the state not legitimizing same sex union is different from forcing a person not to have same sex relation. And I do think that there is a difference. Let me take the latter case first i.e the state forcing a person not to have same sex relation. This is also the question that I paused in the second paragraph.

The state forcing a person not to have same sex relation would mean that the state criminalises people who have same sex relation; meaning, the state considers homosexual activity a crime.

Now if gay right is a human right, what would that mean? Now if gay right is a human right, the state has to take steps to positively and actively promote and legitimise it. This is what being an item of human right would mean. If starvation is a human right issue, then the state should not only starve people, but when there is starvation the state has to actively work and ensure that starvation is wiped out. Now this is problematic.

But are these two the only options -- The state criminalising homosexual activity and the state legitimising and advancing gay marriage saying that it is a matter of human right?

Now if same sex union is a human right, then those religious communities that teach the members of the community against homosexual practice cannot do that. Because saying that homosexual practice is morally wrong and should refrain from that would be a violation of human right of someone. So I would say that to argue for expression of homosexual taste. based on human right is a wrong-headed argument. In my previous post, from a different perspective I argue why same sex marriage should not be legalised, but also why it should not be criminalised; I argue that it should be a non-criminal act yet not a legalised act that the state affirms, recongises and celebrates. It should rather be treated like live-in relationship which is neither a criminal activity nor a legal union.

I agree that homosexual practice should be decriminalised. But to argue for that based on human right is, I think, a mistake. Human right is a thin idea. To put different kinds of right into the category of human right is to do disservice to human right. I think decriminalisation of same sex relation should rather be argued based on the idea of a liberal state.

So the third option is consider it as a non-criminal act, and leave it at that. This is to say that the state is not criminalising it nor is it legalising it. The state does not legitimise gay union no more or no less that it does with adultery or fornication. This way it leaves room for religious communities the freedom to shape the moral consciousness of the members and also the gays to be single or otherwise and also it leaves the state not too morally stringent that it curtails individual liberty nor too morally loose that age old civilisational scaffold like marriage and religious teachings are undermined. 

Monday, November 16, 2015

Lying and Moral Relativism

Is Morality relative to a culture? Professional moral philosophers who are relativists through and through are an extremely rare species today. It may be there in good numbers in other academic departments, but not so in Philosophy departments. One of the reasons why professional moral philosophers who have thought through on this subject do not take such a view on morality is that moral relativism leads to an unlivable society. 

'How do I lead a good life?' or 'What is the right conduct?'  are the kind of questions that bother moral philosophers. This is so because these are the sorts of questions that any rational individual would seek or ought to seek; they are also the concerns of any given society. Every moral theory aims to seek a flourishing society, not just a flourishing life of an individual.  Given that moral theory aims to seek a flourishing society, if a moral theory leads to total breakdown of a society or its logical outcome would lead to a breakdown of society, then it has to be rejected. 

Take the case of lying. Is it okay to tell a lie? No way. Why? If lying is okay, and everybody begins to tell a lie at their own liking and there is no moral prohibition for lying, how would a society look like? That kind of a society cannot function. Let me explain why it is going to be the case. If A tells me a lie again and again and again, and I tell a lie again and again and again to B, and B lies again and again and again to C, how on earth will there be meaningful communication between four of us! And without meaningful communication, a society will break down. A society where red is white sometimes and black other times and blue again later and so on will be chaotic.  This shows that truth telling is a moral requirement for a society to function well. This is the reason why you do anything you want or you speak anything you want, and truth telling is never ever a moral requirement is never ever going to work. Thus, 'thou shalt not tell lies' is a moral requirement for a society to function. 

Now this does not mean that there is no qualification to the statement. Sometimes in certain situation telling a lie may be a requirement. For example, when a Nazi's Gestapo comes home and asks if there is any Jew hiding inside my cupboard, instead of telling them that there are ten Jews hiding inside, I may tell a lie. In such situation telling a lie will be the lesser evil. But just because there is a condition that opens up the door where lying is justifiable, that does not mean that the principle 'thou shalt not tell lies' vanishes. The principle just gets modified little bit: thou shalt not tell lies under normal circumstances but for situation where lying will prevent unjustified killing or something of that sort. 

But there are other moral principles that stand firm irrespective of cultures. For example, something like 'You cannot cut off your children's head just for fun'. Now one may say that no one does that sort of things. True. But no one does that sort of thing because it is considered to be wrong. Moral inquiry is not only about  human action; it is about human inaction too. And human species perform action A or B or C, and not K or L or M or N or O or... because only A or B or C are justifiable. The rest are all unjustifiable. There are many features of human action whose acceptability changes over time; but there are many features of human inaction whose unacceptability remains unchanged over time.


Given this nature of morality one can meaningfully contend that the moral worth of certain human actions/inactions remains unchanged or ought to remain unchanged though the moral worth of certain actions change over time.

PS: The question whether lying is inherently wrong or whether it is wrong because indiscriminate lying  effects breakdown of society is an interesting point. I am not getting into that point here because my concern here is just to show that moral relativism does not work. 

Thursday, October 29, 2015

Interview of Peter Singer

It seems to me Peter Singer is bringing 'up' the status of animals to that of the human or bringing 'down' the level of human to that of the animals. Except for speciation, there don't seem to be any philosophical difference between human and animal.

But I also admire his sincerity when he admits that he is not able to fully carry though the logical demands of his ethical view. But I wonder if he struggles with guilt then. And how much of that haunts him.


Monday, October 26, 2015

Do the Dead Ones Have Rights?

There is a news item that appeared on 24th October, 2015 in the Times of India that says that a dead woman was dug out from out grave and 'sexual exploitation' was performed on the corpse. The policemen say that 'rape' charge could not be applied yet until medical examination is done on the corpse. But the fact that she has been disrobed confirmed some sort of sexual exploitation on the corpse. Is this a wrong action? Is the one who did this doing something that is morally wrong? 

But what is moral wrongdoing? Moral wrongdoing is to harm someone, one may say. But harming a criminal in the form of putting him to jail by the state is not moral wrongdoing; in fact, not harming the criminal that way can be construed as moral wrongdoing upon other citizens when the possibly of this criminal harming other citizens persist. So harming others is not necessarily moral wrongdoing. I would say moral wrongdoing is depriving others of their due right; and when there is a contest of rights, then the one who deserves more or whose rights should take precedence over other's right claims must get what is due. So moral wrongdoing is depriving others of their right. 

So is sexual exploitation of a corpse morally wrong? Yes. I guess that most people will say intuitively that it is wrong. But when we say that it is wrong, then it has to imply that there is a right claim being violated upon by a moral agent. Because without a right claim being violated by a moral agent, moral wrongdoing cannot be accounted for. But the implication of such idea  then underscores that the dead ones too have certain sort of right-claims. It is not only the living ones that bear right, but the dead ones too bear right. And moral wrongdoing can be done even to the dead ones as well, not just to the ones alive at present.

The sort of rights the dead ones have would include the right not to harm their good legacy with lies and not to sexually exploit their corpse. 

Thursday, October 8, 2015

Aristotle and Eugenics

In chapter VII section xvi of The Politics, Aristotle talks about marriage and eugenics. He writes that if one marries too young or too old, children are not healthy. And therefore one should get married at the right age to beget good children. For female, the appropriate age to get married is 18 and for male, it's 37. Aristotle think that this is also good particularly because by the time the man gets weak and old at around 70, the child, if born as planned, would be of marriageable age. 

Aristotle also writes, ' with regard to the choice between abandoning an infant or rearing it, let there be a law that no cripple child be reared.' Aristotle society was not in a position to rear deformed child. They would leave deformed child out in the open to die. To control population, they would even sometimes leave a healthy child to die. Unlike Plato who fixed an exact number for an ideal state,  Aristotle does put an exact number for an idea state. But he says that it should be large enough to be self sustaining and yet not too large that the state cannot 'survey' the number.

This reminds me of a dialogue in a movie called The Mission. One can find the plot of the movie here. A wonderful movie! In this movie, before the transfer of the land where the mission work was being undertaken, from Spanish control to Portuguese control, there was a debate for and against this transfer of land. The one defending the transfer of the land from the Spanish to the Portuguese wanted to capture the native people and sell them as slave. There is handsome money involved in slave trading and under Portuguese law slavery was okay then.  But the one arguing against the transfer, the Christian Priest, feared that such transfer would enslave the native people; and since Spanish law did not allow slave trading, he wanted the land to be under Spanish control. The one defending the transfer says something to the effect that the Guarani people are not fully human; they are rather like animal; they even killed their children... and therefore using them as slave was fine. To this the priest retorted that they had to keep their population under control... and to run away from slave traders, they could not even raise so many children because that made it difficult form them to escape being caught and then sold as slave.

But the point is that leaving deformed children to die was not uncommon in the past. That was there in the Roman society too. And we read of Christians in the first century picking up discarded children from dung heaps and raising them. There might have been other social/religious/ethnic communities having done similar thing; maybe my reading is limited and therefore I am not aware of such stories. But the point is that discarding deformed children was common then. Today all sorts of societies have made such thing illegal. Though we read stories of female foeticide specially in certain part of the world, and the stories are being confirmed through skewed sex ratio, but there is possibly no state/kingdom that does not prohibit such thing officially. Let alone discarding disabled people, the world today strives to invent new machines/tools to enhance their capability to perform different activities as live as normal life as far as possible.

Is the fact that discarding the deformed and the weak  being acceptable in the ancient society but not acceptable now one aspect of moral progress?  I think it is! 

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Possible Outcome of Legalising Same-Sex Marriage in the US

US Supreme Court rules 5-4 in favour of same-sex marriage. Now same-sex couples would be or must be given recognition and affirmation as much as heterosexual marriage. Traditionally marriage is between two consenting adults of opposite sex. Now this definition is modified to indicate that marriage is between two consenting adults.  I can imagine certain questions emerging as consequences of such ruling now and in the years to come. 

1. If two same-sex adults can give mutual consent and get married, why can't consenting adults go for polygamy or polyandry? Questions and comments of these sorts can be posed: Why can't people be allowed to love who they want to love? Why should the state decide who all I marry? I am not harming anyone by marrying three girls/boys, so why can't marriage be just between consenting adults? Why not legalise polygamy/polyandry? 

2. Why must mutual consent be the basis? Why can't one party's consent be enough when the other party cannot say 'yes' nor 'no'? Meaning, why can't I marry my dog that cannot say 'yes' nor 'no'; shouldn't my consent be enough? Why can't I be allowed to love my dog or my lamb? Why should the state refuse to honour my feelings when I am doing harm to no one? Why must consent imply mutual consent? 

3. If one party's consent is the basis, then why can't I marry a lovely and a beautiful child? Why can't an adult marry a child who does not oppose the marriage? Well, those who oppose this and say that this child is physically not ready, they should ask if same-sex marriage also involve 'physical readiness'. If physical relations between same-sex is okay, why is it not okay between an adult and a, say, 13 or 14 year old child? 

4. Why can't I marry myself? I have no objection to myself getting married to myself; I give my consent. 

NB: Very often the argument of a liberal is based on the concept of freedom -- freedom of an individual to do things that harm no one. But taking freedom alone as the basis is quite problematic. As shown above taking freedom as the only basis can lead onto other outcomes in a subtle way. If mutual consent (by exercising freedom) is the basis, then why not mutual consent of few adults for polygamy/polyandry? And then onto other issues as listed above. For the state to legalise and therefore affirm and recognise and publicly laud, I would say the 'purpose' or 'function'  must also be taken into account. (This is Aristotle's line of arugment.) What is the purpose of a marriage? Does same-sex marriage or polygamy/polyandry or human-animal marriage or marrying oneself satisfy the purpose of marriage? 

From liberal point of view where freedom is the basis to decide what the state ought to legalise or not, same-sex marriage is fine. But if we include Aristotle's way of reasoning of taking into account the purpose/functioning, I think it's hard to justify same-sex marriage or the other kinds of marriage. (In fact, polygamy and polyandry would have stronger reason than same-sex marriage if both freedom and function are to be taken together as the basis for legalisation of whatever kind of marriage is to be legalised.) Thus, If freedom and functioning are taken together, I think the only marriage that fulfills the condition is the heterosexual marriage between adults. 

I am not in favour of legalisation of same-sex marriage nor am I in favour of criminalisation of same-sex relation as it is in India now. The state does not have to criminalise live-in relationship between consenting adults nor does the state need to legalise live-in relationship between consenting adults. The state ought not to criminalise same-sex relations because it has to respect the freedom of the individual. But the state also ought not to legalise same-sex marriage because the state must go beyond respecting freedom alone to affirm certain practices; the state must also look at the purpose/function/ telos of that practice. 


Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Polygamy and the Bible

There Bible contains stories of different heroes and villains, so to speak. Figures like Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and David are heroes whereas characters like Esau, Jeroboam, Ahab and Judas are villains, so to speak. Many of the heroes mentioned in the Bible had more than one wife. Many of them had concubines. David had possibly eight wives and many concubines. Abraham had Sarah and Hagar at one point of time; and Jacob had both Leah and her sister Rachel as his wives, not to mention the two concubines. As was common during olden days, most of these heroes had multiple wives. Does the Bible condone polygamy?

The Bible has a grand-narrative, a grand-plot. But the Bible also has sub-narratives, sub-plots. These lives of these characters are part of the sub-narrative, sub-plot. Some characters play a more prominent role than certain other characters. So in the story, not only one would read about polygamy, conspiracy, murder, theft etc but also love, compassion, friendship etc. The story of Abraham or Moses or David would have both of these features. But the point is that the main hero of the grand-narrative is not Abraham nor David; it is Jesus Christ. David's life is not entirely good nor entirely bad; so is Abraham's life. Christians look to Jesus as the role model and also listen to his teaching. There can be certain lesson that one can learn from the life of Abraham or Jacob or David or even from the life of Judas or Ahab. But these figures are not divine and they are mortal!

So to know whether Christians endorse polygamy or not, or whether Bible condones polygamy or not,  one must not look at the lives of these heroes. One must go beyond these figures. Look to Jesus Christ for the answer. And in Matthew 19, when Jesus was asked about adultery, he gives an answer by going back to Genesis chapter first and second -- to what God has intended in the creation about marriage. It reads " ... a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one" ( Matthew 19: 5). Jesus means to say that God's intention is that two will become one; not three or four will become one. And by this he means one male and one female (v. 4).

Certain people, after having read about the lives of Abraham or David, thought that the Bible condones polygamy. But this is based on wrong reading of the narrative. Christians look to Jesus for moral lessons!


Wednesday, May 6, 2015

Human Moral Imperfection and the Desire for Forgiveness

Do you ever struggle with guilt? The guilt that arises because you have done something that is bad or because you have failed to do something that is good. I think all of us would have done things that are bad or would have failed to do things that are good and therefore ought to be done at that point of time, and yet walked away without having to do it. Incidents such as these might occur over and over again. However, the guilt may not strike to every individual as much as it would strike to certain individuals. If you have ever struggled with guilt, it would serve as an evidence that you are not morally perfect; that you have at times being morally imperfect. 

But what about those who do not struggle with guilt? Can we say that they think that they are morally perfect. I don't think any grown person can really say that he or she is morally perfect. The guilt may not strike as hard it has happened to certain other people. In fact, the guilt may not just be there. But to feel guilty or to be aware of being guilty of certain bad actions is not necessarily the only outcome after having done a bad action or failed to have performed a good action. Some people just tell lies without any apparent sense of remorse even when there is no apparent compelling reason to tell a lie. By 'compelling reason' I mean a situation such as this. A friend of yours is hiding in your room. Some people came to ask you if she is hiding in your room. You sense that they intended to kill her with their machete. You are pretty confident that your friend is not wrong. In such a situation, telling a lie to save her would be a compelling reason to lie. So when we go out to the market the taxi driver may lie to us or the shopkeeper may just lie to us without any compelling reason. And when such people lie, they may not appear to have any sense of guilt. But that does not really mean that such lie is a good thing; a lie is still a lie. For such people, a lie is not followed by a sense of remorse. 

Upon probing if such a lie is bad or good, the one who lied would admit that such a lie is not a good thing. In fact if the truth is found out and the person is confronted, it is highly likely that the person would be put in a defensive mode or even be ashamed of the lie. But often a lie is not caught, and even if caught direct confrontation is avoided. And even when confronted some people would try to cover up with another lie. And this evading continues. But again evading the truth is rather like admitting implicitly that a lie is considered a lie and it is not good. 

But all of this is to do with individual's perception of good and bad. The idea of good and bad goes beyond what the individual understands for oneself. You jump the traffic light; the policeman will catch and imposes fine on you. You cannot really say that you are not aware of the traffic rule and therefore you should be let off the hook. Even when you are being honestly ignorant, you broke the law, and you must pay penalty. Now again we can argue saying that not every legislated norm is good. Fair enough! Definitely depending on the kind of government in power, laws sometime are legislated unfairly. For example, a dictator may refuse voting right to certain ethnic group just because they are different or he may even suspend the Parliament. The law is passed in such cases, yet given a free and fair condition to argue back and forth, one can establish a case that such a legislated norm is not right. So there are situations when one can say that laws are not good. However, it still remains that there are also quite a lot items of legal norms that are good and must be honored. Breaking such honorable laws, knowingly or unknowingly, entails moral imperfection on the part of the individual. Guilt may follow or not, but moral imperfection is a logical consequence of such violation of legislated norms! 

In so many literary pieces, one can read cases of men and women who have grappled with guilt because of having done something bad. For example, king David in the Bible felt terribly bad because of the kind of bad actions that he committed. First he committed adultery with a woman named Bathsheba. That was bad. But he realized that this act might possibly be found out. And therefore he had her husband killed in a battle. Being the king he was able to hatch such a plan! That was really bad. David struggled with guilt and he expressed the guilt. David did not think that he was morally perfect. Mahatma Gandhi felt terribly sorry over the fact that he could not be with his dad at his dying hour. He was with his had but then he had gone to be with his wife when his dad would have breathed his last breathe. And so when his dad passed away, he would have been sleeping with his wife. He felt that it was a moral failure on his part. Gandhi did not consider himself morally perfect. These are great figures, revered by thousands and millions of people across generations. They thought they had their moral failures. What about you? What about me? I don't think I am morally perfect. There are things that I had done and guilt did not strike immediately. There are things that I had done and guilt just struck so quickly. Examples. When I was in school, probably in the half-yearly exam of 9th standard, I did not get good result as I had thought of. I was afraid to show at home because I got bad marks. I fudged my result and put principal's signature myself. I showed at home that I got good result. Nobody at home came to know about it. I lied! I lied about my mark few years later again. My result did not show as I had anticipated. I fudged my mark sheet again.  I lied! Years later, I realized that what I had done was not right. Guilt struck me only years later, not immediately. But because guilt struck me so hard I discarded my fudged mark sheet and got hold of the real mark sheet. The time when guilt struck me so quickly was when I had watched porn videos. This is not something that took years for me to let the guilt surface in me. The guilt surfaced right after having spent sometime watching porn. And these cases show, at least to myself, that I am not morally perfect. But these are just a handful of examples. If I have to list about my moral failures, it's just so many. 

And I do think that each one of us has moral failures. In fact, to insist that one is morally perfect sounds rather like lying to oneself. But given this pervasive moral failure and therefore guilt, how do we get forgiveness or how do we sort this out? After all grappling with guilt for ages and ages is not good. It does lot of harm to oneself, if not to other people around us. For example, in Shakespeare's Macbeth, we read of lady Macbeth having to hallucinate because of her struggle with guilt. She had played a key role in getting the king murdered. And now guilt is catching up with her. Had she gotten rid of this guilt sooner, she would not have to face this predicament. But she did not get rid of this guilt. And now her life is in ruin because of her guilt. It is an extremely  wise way of living not to lie to oneself, and therefore it is important to get rid of guilt. 

If we broke traffic rule, we pay penalty. But what do we do if there is moral failure and therefore we struggle with guilt? Go and reconcile with whom I have wronged! But if I feel guilty because I have watched porn, to whom do I go to get rid of my guilt? If I felt guilty because I had fudged my marks, to whom do I go to get rid of my guilt? When king David committed sin, the first person he went to was God. He thought that since God is his Lord, to whom he is to be accountable to, he must first set things right with God. And so he asks for forgiveness from God. I believe that since God is the giver of my breathe and the moral law within, I owe my life to him and my reconciliation must take place with him first. Given this factor, I ask God for forgiveness. God is a loving God, and when I seek forgiveness, I believe, he forgives. When I see forgiveness from my mother, she forgives, because she loves me. Why won't God who loves me forgives me when I seek forgiveness! Anyone who loves you will forgive you, if you seek forgiveness. If I had stolen something from X, of course, it is good to settle with X. So if something of this sort is required to settle things, settle it. But not all of moral failure is of this sort. And when it is not of this sort, I think settling with God is what really matters! 

There is moral failure on my part from time to time. And each time I come to God. I don't want this moral failure. Yet there is a strong pull in me that drags me down and so sometimes I fall. But each time I get up and say sorry to God, he forgives me. I don't think I will ever be able to live a morally perfect life, a life that is morally perfect for, say, a year. But then the cross of Jesus Christ tells me that my sins are being forgiven and that I ought not to commit sins again. 

I imagine that the world would be a better place if all humans would address the guilt that one struggles with. If we grapple with guilt, then the possibility of not doing the same action is there. The possibility of not stealing again, the possibility of not killing again, the possibility of not lying again and so on. Given that guilt elicits in us a response that prevents us from committing the same bad action, I think, it is fair to say that awaking in us a feeling of guilt for the bad actions we have done in the past is good. Having a guilt free life is better compared to a guilt ridden life! The problem is thus not so much about not having a solution do deal with guilt because forgiveness is available so as to get rid of guilt; the problem is rather that many people do not wake from their 'moral slumber' and are not able to receive forgiveness.

Blessed are those who desired forgiveness because of their guilt and have received forgiveness! 




Friday, November 14, 2014

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapters 8-10

I would say chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 require very careful reading. In chapter 7, Nick gives a lengthy description of political emotions of the eudaimonists. I have avoided giving the explanation of the finer points then and just give the final bid of his argument. In chapter 8, Nick argues why Augustine broke away from the eudaimonist tradition. The chapter is titled 'Augustine's Break With Eudaimonism'. And chapter 9 is titled 'Moral Vision of Scripture in Antiquity, and chapter 10 'Characterizing Life-and History-Goods'. And again a lengthy discussion on political emotions is laid out. The discussions in fact bring out the rigor of Nick's scholarship! This post combines chapter 8, 9 and 10.

The Stoics held that tranquility is necessary to lead a eudaimon life, a life that is well lived. However, the Stoics also believed that since the tranquility can be disturbed by external factors or those outside of me, one should value only those that are within one's control. Be virtuous and be happy! That would be a Stoic.

But the Parepatetics would say that there are external factors or those outside that are helpful for me in me becoming a virtuous person. So a Parepatetics may value an external good or those outside. However, the purpose for loving this good or those outside of me is so that I may become a more virtuous person. And if I lose this good or those outside, I grieve! Aristotle's eudaimonia is a sort of egoism.  Augustine goes further. Augustine thinks that one is to love one's neighbour as one loves oneself (just as his master Jesus Christ taught). So to value an external good or those outside is not just to help me become more virtuous, but because it/he/she is love-worthy. And if I lose this person, I grieve not just because I lose someone I prize or value because this person would help me to become more virtuous, but because I have compassion for the person. My life thus is then not going well if I grieve because I lose someone close. 

For the eudaimonists, the two way relational traffic with others is not really the emphasis; it's one way. For Augustine, it's a two-way traffic; it's about social relationship! Since rights are about social relationship, this way of looking about life can only account for a theory of rights. An account of life that takes into consideration the interest of the individual self alone cannot account for a theory of right. Augustine's conception of life is thus unlike Aristotle's well-lived life that concerns only with how well I live my individual life; Augustine's conception of life is about well-going life; or rather flourishing life, that takes into consideration the surrounding conditions. 

Tuesday, November 4, 2014

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 7

This chapter discusses the idea why Eudaimonism cannot account for a theory of right. The chapter is titled 'Why Eudaimonism Cannot Serve as Framework for a Theory of Right'. The previous chapter is here. The chapter discusses about the viewpoint of the Stoics and the Parepatitics. There are differences between the two. But for the purpose of arguing for the point Nick attempts to make, the distinction is not so crucial. However,  the same points that Nick raises create a hole or seems to create a hole in the philosophical skin of the eudaimonists of both strands.

A eudaimonist believes that virtuous activities are essential to living a life well. 'Eudaimonia' is translated 'happy', but it is not happiness in the sense of living a fun filled live. A happy life is about living a virtuous life doing the sort of things that a good person is supposed to be doing. So the function of the man is important besides the point that it is in accordance with having acquired a good habit. Even if you are doing the right thing, say, fighting a war instead of running away from the battle like a coward, if you are fighting the war because the king tells you that running from war without fighting will mean killing you and your family members, you are not really doing the 'good thing' out of having acquired the virtue of courage; you are just doing the right thing out of fear for your life or the lives of your beloved ones. For a eudaimonist, this is not living a life well. To live a life your life, cultivating courage is important, and also fighting the just war. 

Now Nick argues. If someone speaks ill of you behind your back, and your living well is not harmed at all, your right is violated, yet your living well is not harmed. This sort of example demonstrates that right theory cannot go along with the eudaimonist concept of living well. To have a a theory of life and a theory of right go together, one must move beyond the concept of a happy life as espoused by the eudaimonist.


Friday, October 24, 2014

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 6

Chapter 6 is titled ' Locating That to Which We Have Rights'. The previous post on chapter 5 is here. This chapter 6 is a shift from the biblical trajectory that was there in the previous chapters. This brings the concept of right back to theoretical discourse. In this chapter and the following few chapters, Nick is going to argue that given this idea about right that everybody, so to speak, acknowledges, there are certain theories that cannot accommodate this concept of right. Since these theories cannot accommodate this concept of right, we have to discard these theories. (Nick does not really put it like this though!) 

We all  have certain sorts of right -- not necessarily legal right. Sonya has a right not to be captured with a hidden camera while she takes bath. Sunny has a right to his son not being run over by a speeding bus while going to school. If Sonya is spied on, her right is violated even if the one who spied on her keeps the picture all to himself and no one else, including Sonya, never comes to know about this. If Sunny's son is run over by a speeding son, his right is violated. This right is a condition and/or event in a person's life; it's a life-good of a person. Moreover, even on her funeral day, Kim has a right not be demeaned for what she did not do. This means to say that even a dead person possesses certain sort of right. Can we also say that future generation -- not yet born now -- have a right to clean air, such that cutting down all the trees now would amount to violating the right of the future generation? Anyway, the point is that there are certain sort of rights a person can claim for his life and history (something that happens even after her death); the sort of right that will contribute to her well-being.

There are three concepts of a good life, says Nick. First, experientially satisfying life (hedonistic kind of life).  Second, Happy life... the eudaimon life (of Aristotelian kind). Third, flourishing life. Nick argues that an experientially satisfying life cannot serve as a framework for the kind of right we possess. Meaning, an experientially satisfying life kind of a concept of life cannot account for the different kinds of rights that a human possesses. Suppose, someone speaks ill of you behind your back, and you never get to know about it nor does that alter your condition of life at all; you remain experientially satisfied as you have been without this particular episode. Or suppose, someone accuses you of having siphoned of a huge sum of money ten years after your death just to malign your reputation. On both these counts, your experientifally satisfying life is not harmed at all. Yet, on both the counts, your right is being violated. Thus, an experientially satisfying life as a theory for a good life cannot really take into account the kinds of rights an individual possesses. We have to search an alternative theory for a good life that can take into account  the right that an individual possesses. 

Thursday, September 11, 2014

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 1

The first post that introduces the book is here. Nick's book is loaded with finer distinctions between various philosophical opinions, and therefore, it is not easy to summarize the book without cutting out certain points. This indicates the depth of his engagement with the matter, and yet one can get lost too unless one concentrates. This is not a book that you can just relax and read; it requires serious reading! 

Nick provides a preliminary description of right in the introductory chapter. He gives another preliminary description of right in this chapter again. The last paragraph of this post will explain this concept. In this chapter the author explains the difference between the concept of justice  laid out by right order theorists like Plato and his own version which is similar to that of Roman jurist Ulpian.


This is Plato's version of justice given in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato narrates the account of Socrates' dialogues with his friends to obtain concepts of justice for an individual soul as well as for the city. For this blog, I am simplifying Plato's account. To obtain the concept of justice, Plato  begins by asking what the function of a city is. And he says that the function of a city is: to provide  provision, to defend itself and to govern the citizens. Then he goes on to ask how the city would function well. He says a city would function well when there is division of labour (say, a craftsman doing his craft to provide provision; a soldier defending the city; and the king governing the city well) based on natural ability and education. Thus, if there is no mistake in the structural division and educational provided based on one's natural ability, and the different parties function based on their respective ability, it will be a good city, a city that functions well. It will then be a city where justice prevail -- where there is right order. 

In the book, Nick explains Ulpian's version first and then comes to Plato's version. I reverse the order for this blog post. Ulpian writes that justice is a "steady and enduring will to render to each other their ius."  'Ius' is normally translated as 'right', but the word 'right' here needs explanation. For example, because you have promised to pay me Rs. 100 if I work in your garden for two hours, I did work for two hours. Now you refused to pay me. I have the right to be paid. But I am not enjoying my right. The fact that you refused to pay me does not make my right vanish; it's just that I am not enjoying my right. When you pay me, I shall be enjoying my right. Thus, justice prevails when I enjoy my right, when my 'ius' is honoured. When my right is denied, I am wronged by you. You are guilty; and I am wronged. For justice to prevail, I need to enjoy my right. 

The right order theorists argue that rights come about because of legislation, speech acts etc. Whereas Nick argues that rights do come about that way, but there is more to it.  Nick argues that rights also come about because the entity possesses certain property, stand in certain sort of relationship with other entities or perform certain sort of action; they have certain inherent rights. This is the difference between right theorists like Nick and right order theorist like Plato. Thus, the difference basically is, if I may surmise, whether there is any right called inherent right or not. And this (natural) inherent right is not natural right! By natural right, generally it means the conferred natural right, not inherent right. Right order theorists can accept conferred natural right or rather simply natural right, but not inherent right. And Nick is going to defend the idea of inherent right and the concept of justice based on inherent right an individual possesses.

Thursday, August 28, 2014

Introduction of Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs

Besides other posts, I am going to be blogging about Justice: Rights and Wrongs, written by philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff of Yale University. This is not a book review, but a summary of each chapter. I have read the book twice, and this is my third reading of the book. Most of the books I have read do not get the privilege of being read twice, let alone thrice. C S Lewis Mere Christianity, Vinoth Ramachandra's God's That Fail  and Michael Sandel's Justice: What's the Right Things to do? are the only three books I have read twice, as far as I could remember right now. The Bible and Wolterstorff's book Justice are going to be the only two books I would have read thrice or more! Since this is my third reading, I want to believe that I have understood him well.

The book has 17 chapters, besides Preface and Introduction in the beginning and Epilogue at the end. So it's as if it has 20 chapters. This post will summarise Preface and Introduction together.

Nick begins to engage with the concept of justice after two life-changing events. The first one is on Apartheid South Africa in 1976, where he witnessed the Afrikaners denying justice to the 'blacks' and 'coloured' people. The second event in on Palestinian  issue in 1978, where he heard the Palestinians speak out against injustice meted out to them. These events energised him to speak out against injustice like no other events before. 

Nick is explicit that he is a Christian and his account of justice is a theistic account. Even so, his account of justice is based on inherent right that an individual possesses. He begins in the Introduction by stating that there are oppositions to the concept of rights as justice from within and outside the religious tradition he comes from. Some say that ethics of care is more appropriate; others argue against right-talks due to political and social reasons. Some say that the idea of right as justice gives rise to individualistic way of thinking and therefore it should be discouraged. Right-proponents are alleged to have said, 'this is my right; that is my right etc.' and focus so much on individual right, and thus fail to talk about care, responsibility, duty, obligation etc. Nick argues that it is one thing to care, but another thing to be cared; it is one thing to fail to do one's moral duty and thus wrong a person, but another thing to be a victim and be wronged. The language of care, duty, obligation etc cannot accommodate the story of the victim, of the one being wronged. Thus, doing away with the language of rights is to entail doing away with the story of the victim, and this is something we cannot afford. Theory of justice requires language and concept of rights, and we cannot do away with rights based concept of justice. This is Nick's defence of rights based idea of justice. 

Nick says that there are two primary conceptions of justice in the western tradition: justice as right order and the concept of justice based on inherent rights. Former is Plato's view and those who agree with him and the latter is his view and those who have argued something similar to his view even earlier. Aristotle's concept of justice as equality is possibly the third conception. Nick is going to argue for the concept of justice based on inherent right. But he will also be rejecting what proponents of justice as right order say about rights based justice which is that rights based idea of justice emerged much later. Nick will argue  that right-theorists position emerged much before Medieval period and therefore is not of recent origin and that this concept does not necessarily give rise to excessive individualism.

Friday, July 4, 2014

Must Soldiers Fight Unjust Wars?

If the state ever legislates an act that says that all the citizens must worship the statue of the Prime Minister/President, do I have to obey the law? Or must I obey a law that says that I should never ever utter a word against the economic policy of the government? Living in such a state of condition would be terrible! It is likely that most people in 21st century may say that it would be better to rebel against such system and overthrow it; put to an end such kind of system. However, as many would be willing to fight against such regime – not even worthy of being called a government – there would be many others who would be willing to die fighting to protect such system.

Wars come and go. Some wars are just; some unjust. If we are to loosely define them, one may define them as wars that are waged to expand territory are unjust whereas wars that are fought in self-defence are just. On both counts, the soldiers play the key role. Even when it is an unjust war, it is the soldiers who go out to the field to fight; and again in just war too, it is the soldiers who go out to fight to protect the people and the territory. Whether it is the US invasion of Iraq on the pretext of Saddam Hussein producing WMD or the Qaddhafi's army fighting to protect his dictatorial regime, it was the soldiers who composed the main fighting unit. The moral dilemma that may emerge before a soldier is whether they join the fight against bad regime or fight and even kill the civilians who attempt to overthrow such oppressive government; or whether to go and even fight in a foreign territory as an occupational army or leave the army.

Army units do not function on democratic principle which guarantees one a significant amount of right to dissent though it is the civil government which may be in place. Whether it is a big army or a small army, army personnel are bound by the oath they have taken to follow the order of their superior. The order given by the superior may not always be just and fair, yet they are bound by the oath as long as they remain in the army. Imagine a situation where someone puts a revolver on your forehead and asks you to shoot a child. You can refuse to shoot and get yourself killed or you can shoot and yet remain blameless. The reason why you remain blameless despite killing an innocent child is because your action was not intentional. This is the kind of situation an army personnel face in a battlefield. You disobey an order of your superior and so get court-martialed or you obey order.

These are the options before a person: first, do not join the army and you face no such situation whether one must fight or not fight an unjust war; you take up other job. Second, join the army but quit much ahead because you see foresee potential dilemma. Third, stay in the army and report for duty and be obedient to the orders given to you. The third option is what many army personnel do. If the fight is judged to be unjust later, the responsible official or officer who gave the order is to be held responsible for the order, not the soldiers acting on the order.

Monday, July 8, 2013

What if Modi had Rescued 15,000 Gujaratis...?

After the flash flood came the war of words among the politicians! It was reported that Narendra Modi, the CM of Gujarat, had rescued 15,000 stranded Gujaratis from the flood hit Uttarakhand. Criticism poured in saying Modi should not have rescued only the Gujarat; he should have rescued Indians. BJP went onto a defensive mode and began denying that such a thing was never claimed by Modi or any BJP leader. Well, it was purely the creation of the anti-BJP camp in the media or whether the news was first planted by Modi, I don't know. But suppose Modi had acted like a Rambo and indeed rescued 15,000 stranded Gujaratis, is there any problem? 

Narendra Modi is the Chief Minister of Gujarati. It is his job to care for the people of Gujarati. He is responsible for the welfare of the people of the state he rules. He is not the CM of Uttarakhand. And so his primary focus should be for the Gujaratis, not those from UK or UP or TN. He is also not the Prime Minister or Home Minister of India and therefore it is not required of him to be equally concerned for all the people of India. It is the office that is centered in Gujarat that gives him the power and position, and therefore his primary concern should be that of the people of Gujarat. 

So, is it really a problem if he had rescued 15,000 Gujaratis on the basis of 'Gujarati first'? I see no problem here. 

Suppose, two children are drowning and one is your child and the other a stranger, and you can save only one: which one would you save? Of course, your child. Suppose, a ship that carries 500 Indians and 500 Pakistanis hit an ice-berg; and Indian Govt has time and resources at that point of time to rescue only 500 passengers: would it save the Indians first or the Pakistanis or toss a coin? Well, Indians first! That's my take. The idea of solidarity: family, state, country... insists that the priority goes that way. Of course, if all the 1000 passengers could be saved, and if only 500 Indians are taken on board that is immoral; that is wrong. But when both the parties are deserving, but one is "your people" and the other party a "strangers", and you have resources to save only one party, then it's really fair to give priority to "your people".

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Is Job Reservation Fair?

Job reservation is an affirmative action by the Govt of India to advance the well being of the backward community. The government thus reserves 7.5% for the Tribals, 15% for the Scheduled Caste and  27% for the Other Backward Caste in the public sector. The controversy regarding who all fit to be in the category of the underprivileged community is a different matter from whether there has to be job reservation at all. 

On Monday i.e 22 October, 2012, there was a sad and an interesting news item in the Indian Express. It carried the story of an infant Damini whose mother died after the delivery on September 20. Since there was no one to care for the baby, the father who was a rickshaw puller was taking care of her on a cloth sling around his neck. And the news item further added that the man was using a hired rickshaw. It is a kind of a worst situation where one could possibly be in!

Hindustan Times on September 23rd, 2013 carried a news item giving the figures of salary of over ten executives in India. Naveen Jindal tops the list, according to the news item. And Jindal's salary was 7342,00000 rupees per year. The second in the list earns 5701,00000 rupees per year, and this second spot has two people. If we divide Naveen Jindal's annual salary 7342,00000 by 12 it comes to 611,83333 rupees -- and that is the monthly income of this man. And if this monthly earning is divided by 30, it gives 20,39444 -- daily income. A daily income of 20 Lakhs 39 Thousand and Four hundred Forty Four! 

With such figures, there is a huge gap between the well-being of Damini and Naveen Jindal's child. (Well-being does not always depend on having so much money, but if one is compelled by the circumstances to starve, question is about survival. And when one is compelled to starve, well-being is seriously undermined.) When well-being is thus divided between members of the community by the economic forces and the governing principles, the system is not fair unless it does something to rectify the gap. Those people who argue for non-intervention by any government agency to regulate the gap -- against reservation policy -- are misguided. To let the rich get richer, aided by the economic and political design and the poor like Damini remain in their miserable state is inhumane. One of ways then to rectify the gap is to device reservation policy, and this policy has to be such that only those who truly deserve it get to benefit from it. Without such policy, there is no way Damini would be able to compete with Naveen Jindal's child!

There is a piece of writing being circulated, attributed to Azim Premji, arguing against reservation. ( I am not sure if it's really his thought). But I am intrigued by his argument. Azim got the best of education in the world -- earning his Bachelors Degree from Stanford University, US. He was born into a family that was rich enough to send him to receive education from one of the finest institutions in the world. He was being lucky! Had he been born in place of Damini, where would he be? To be well-off and to be educated with the finest education is not entirely one's own doing. Yes, he did work hard to pass the exam; but had he not received proper parenting, he might have been a boy out there on the street doing drugs and begging. Had his parents been from a very poor background, he might be illiterate. Had he been born in Capua, (present Italy) in the first century, he might have been a gladiator. For so many people the story of misfortune is not entirely one's own doing; circumstances which are beyond one's own control are also contributing factor to one's present predicament. By similar token, one's own fortune is not entirely one's own doing; there are circumstances that are not my doing that have led me  thus far. Given this reality, to blame the less unfortunate ones entirely or to be least bothered about the welfare of those who are less unfortunate is not morally right. After all our fortune depends on 'cosmic lottery' too! So the question is whether those who are fortunate because 'cosmic lottery' ( family background, in- born talents, location, friendship etc) favours them will enjoy the fruit of their 'cosmic lottery' winning themselves or share with those who are less fortunate? Of course, like non-human animals we can care only for our herds; and leave the rest to feed or to starve. Or we can rise above our basal animal instinct and be like humans -- caring for each other across generations and locations. And practical implication of such caring must result in reservation policy.

And as a society, it is going to be more peaceful if there is relative equality between the members of a society. When some are starving outside, and some are having hundred items of food on the table inside a hotel/home, disaster is not so far away. 

NB: Edited on 27th May 2014. 

Saturday, July 7, 2012

What A Talent This Man Possesses!

Is the talent that this man possesses his doing or is it naturally gifted? Is it fair to say that if this talent is his doing, he deserves to keep the money he makes through such demonstration of the talent but if the talent is naturally gifted then he deserves to share the advantages/money he makes with those who are least gifted? Well, Michael Winslow is the name of this talented person.  And this is what John Rawls would say about the question raised above. The fact that Mr. Winslow lives in an age that prizes such demonstration is not his doing nor is it his doing that he was not born in Egypt in 2500 BC that would never provide him the chance to be famous. The kind of society that allows him to perform in TV or hears about effect/guitar is not his doing either. Since he happened to be living in a time such as this, he cannot claim exclusively for himself the advantages or privileges that accrue to him. He must therefore share the fruit of his talent with those who are least gifted. I do think Rawls has a point there. If we examine in detail how we have arrived  where we are now we may in for a surprise. The family we are born into; the society that prizes the career we have opted; the value system that society engenders etc are beyond our control. We just happen to reap the favourable conditions contingent factors have brought about. This should not totally undermine the willful decisions we have made. But one should not also undermine the other factors which are not our doing. This reality situates us in the position where failing to share the privileges we enjoy now with those who are least advantaged becomes a kind of injustice. And injustice is injustice. And we humans are made to continue living an unjust life.THE TAKE HOME LESSON IS THIS: WHETHER YOU ARE AN ENGINEER OR A DOCTOR OR A MANAGER, SHARE YOUR EARNINGS AND PRIVILEGES WITH THOSE WHO ARE LEAST PRIVILEGED.

Friday, March 23, 2012

Democracy: Government off the People, fool the People and buy the People?

The write up is to be situated in the context of the election that was held in Manipur, a north eastern state of India, on 28th January 2012. The election was probably the most corrupt eonein the history of Manipur's democracy. There would have been not a single candidate that did not use unfair means to get votes. At then end it was the Congress that emerged victorious. And the reasons are many, but one key reason was that no one else could match the money power of the Congress party.

It has become a kind of a set pattern to buy voters. There were candidates who did not visit their constituency due to threats to their life. ( I am not going to get into that now.) But even such candidates got elected. How was that possible? They sent in their workers to the constituency with bundles of money. And voters were purchased. All candidates used money power to purchase voters. And buying voters likewise is illegal. And it is immoral too. It is immoral because election are supposed to be fought on the basis of candidates' merits. And distributing money distorts the very definition of democratic election. Candidates who purchased voters , therefore, are using unfair means to get elected. Period. 

The voters who took money in exchange for her vote too is wrong. Even if the money was distributed, the voter need not take it. So the voter too was a party to the malpractice. And I appreciate those voters who were able to say NO to money. And this refusal to take money in exchange for vote is something we all need to copy.

I would further say that even if money has been taken by a voter from a candidate, there is no valid reason to be obligated to vote for the candidate. As of now if voters have taken money from Mr. A, they are obligated to vote for Mr. A. So the the one who offers more money will get more votes! But such obligation will perpetuate the ongoing corrupt practice. And if we have to blunt the power of money to purchase voter, we have to do away with the obligation. Therefore, to achieve an end which is good i.e making the power of money to buy voter redundant, I believe it is okay not to be obligated to vote for the person from whom one has taken money. 

This is not to say "take money, but don't vote for the who gave you the money". It is rather saying "don't take money; but even if you take money you don't have to feel obligated to vote for the one who gave you money".  So the actual emphasis is on "don't give money & don't take money". The third punchline is to provide additional cushion to fight unfair way of using money power during election.

Monday, December 19, 2011

What is Justice?

Treating the neighbour justly is a classic case of loving the neighbour. The third century Roman jurist defines justice as steady and enduring will to render to each his or her ius. Society is just insofar as its members are rendered the ius that they possess, the ius that is theirs. One may possess some ius without enjoying that ius; so it is important to note that justice is rendering to each his or her right or deserts (what he or she deserves).
Example: When you are deprived of your ius, your right, to a seat in a train, you are not enjoying your right; here justice is not rendered to you. One may call this ius as primary justice. When a murderer is let scot free without any punishment, we don't speak of punishment as something the murderer has a right to but as something he deserves. Here punishment is the murderer's just deserts, the ius. One may call this ius as corrective justice. Thus justice is rendering each one his or her right or deserts, ius.
Right-talk is to be located only in a social context, not in a vacuum. I have a right to be treated in a certain way by you or vice versa. This social bonds of rights are foundational to human community and human flourishing. To fail to treat a person as she has a right to my treating her is to wrong her. To fail to treat a society as it has a right to my treating her is to wrong it. Conversely, to fail to treat me as I have a right to be treated is to wrong me.