This chapter discusses the idea why Eudaimonism cannot account for a theory of right. The chapter is titled 'Why Eudaimonism Cannot Serve as Framework for a Theory of Right'. The previous chapter is here. The chapter discusses about the viewpoint of the Stoics and the Parepatitics. There are differences between the two. But for the purpose of arguing for the point Nick attempts to make, the distinction is not so crucial. However, the same points that Nick raises create a hole or seems to create a hole in the philosophical skin of the eudaimonists of both strands.
A eudaimonist believes that virtuous activities are essential to living a life well. 'Eudaimonia' is translated 'happy', but it is not happiness in the sense of living a fun filled live. A happy life is about living a virtuous life doing the sort of things that a good person is supposed to be doing. So the function of the man is important besides the point that it is in accordance with having acquired a good habit. Even if you are doing the right thing, say, fighting a war instead of running away from the battle like a coward, if you are fighting the war because the king tells you that running from war without fighting will mean killing you and your family members, you are not really doing the 'good thing' out of having acquired the virtue of courage; you are just doing the right thing out of fear for your life or the lives of your beloved ones. For a eudaimonist, this is not living a life well. To live a life your life, cultivating courage is important, and also fighting the just war.
Now Nick argues. If someone speaks ill of you behind your back, and your living well is not harmed at all, your right is violated, yet your living well is not harmed. This sort of example demonstrates that right theory cannot go along with the eudaimonist concept of living well. To have a a theory of life and a theory of right go together, one must move beyond the concept of a happy life as espoused by the eudaimonist.
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