Journey Toward Justice 24

This chapter is titled 'The Structure of Social Justice Movements.' Injustice can be meted out to an individual by another individual, but it can also be in the form of one community towards another community over a long period of time. In the latter case, removing injustice gets complicated and oftentimes it takes times too. But history has shown that injustice of such sort has been addressed. Addressing injustice at social level take three stages, generally speaking. First, it involves identifying the victims. Laws may be discriminatory towards certain group of people or it could be public practice or perception. Whatsoever, identifying the victims comes as a first step. Second, it involves responding the situation emotionally. Responding must involve emotions because unless people come up with 'this must not continue anymore', it is unlikely to generate social change. Third, it involves activation, which is to critique the ongoing practice or analyse the source of such practice and then critique. Critiquing this way may generate social conflict because those who perpetuating the practice may not want to change their way of functioning or those who are enjoying power at the expense of the victim may not want to give up power. Given that a social change is required, oftentimes this may generate hostile conflict. 

Of course, Nick mentions that not all the social justice movements may follow this pattern in exact sequence. But then it's fair to generalise the pattern! 

Journey Toward Justice 22

This chapter is titled 'Art in the Struggle to Right Injustice'. In this chapter Nick talks about the connection between seeking justice and Art. But what is Art? Art is music, painting, songs, poetry etc. But how are these things connected to seeking justice? When people sang 'We shall overcome' and marched together to seek civil rights in the US, would it have made any difference if they had marched together without singing the song? Had the anti-apartheid movement marched without singing a song, would there be any difference if they had marched with songs being sung by the protesters? They would! But why? It has a 'mysterious uniting effect'. Without the tune, the words fall flat; it does not elevate the words. In similar fashion, singing or humming while working elevates the tedious nature of the work; it distracts us from the weariness of the work! 

And art perhaps in a mysterious way, or rather in a sublime way, awakens in some of us our slumber that which we would otherwise have been quite oblivious about! 

Journey Toward Justice 6

There are different sorts of reasons given against rights-talk; against the language of rights being employed to talk about fairness in the society. One of the main arguments against rights-talk, as Nick sees it, is that this sort of thing amounts to strong sense of individualistic thing. 'My right' 'my right' 'my right' kind of thing conveys a sense of individualistic thought. Nick concedes that this might be there, but then the fact that this is there does not mean that we throw out the whole concept of rights. If we throw out the whole concept of rights, this would be throwing the baby with the water. What is the required is that where there is wrong employment of the concept or where there is abuse of rights language, there needs to be correction. After all many social movement like civil rights movement in the US or the movement against apartheid in South Africa and so on employed the language of rights and brought social change, yet they are hardly about excessive individualistic thinking. 

What critics of rights-talk often leave unsaid is what will be lost or what moral category/concept would be lost if this language or concept of rights is altogether discarded. And Nick would venture on to argue that something very key to moral discourse would be lost if this language of right is altogether discarded from our society. Therefore, rights-talk or language of right must continue to be part of our moral discourse. 

Journey Toward Justice 5

Nick tells that there are two ways in the West that people think about justice: right order conception and inherent rights conception. Plato's Republic, for example, is the former kind while his (Nick's) is the latter kind. Proponents of the former kind holds that a society is just if it is rightly ordered, or rather conforms to certain principle. Proponents of the latter kind holds that a society is just if people are treated as they have a right to be treated. Nick says that Rawls also falls into this right order conception of justice. 

So Plato's conception is of the former kind and so is Rawls' conception. I fancy that Nick would agree that Mill's conception is also of the former kind and also that of the capability approach especially that which is advanced by the likes of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen; and this would also include the one advanced by Michael Sandel. 

Nick argues that if we look at debates about justice/injustice in the past, those who faced injustice often did not appeal to certain principle to insist that they were wrongly treated; they just spoke about saying that they were denied of their rights and that they were wrongly treated. They were performing their action from the vantage point Nick advances though they may not be developing a theory about it; Nick also did the same thing in the beginning. It was only later that he developed a theory that matches his previous actions. 

This is rather interesting because Nick has argued elsewhere for certain epistemological position which in effects says that there are beliefs (and so actions) that is in us which may not have philosophical ground for taking such a view but over a period of time we come to be aware of such belief and then go on to provide a philosophical ground for holding such a belief. So it's not that philosophical justification/ground always precedes belief; sometimes it could be that belief precedes philosophical justification. 

Journey Toward South 1

Journey Toward Justice

By Nicholas Wolterstorff

Baker Academic

2013

This is the first chapter of the book. In this chapter Nick tells the story of how he came to believe that he got a call from God through the words of the ones wronged and  that he needs to speak up for the wronged ones. He did not have such a conviction earlier, but after having gone through certain experiences his understanding of things changed. There are two experiences that he tells in the book. 

The first is his encounter of Apartheid in South Africa in a Conference in 1975. In the Conference, he heard and saw blacks and coloured people speaking out angrily about the dehumanising experiences they faced daily due to state policy called Apartheid. The Afrikaners deflected the charge by saying that such a policy was required to enable different people group to maintain their ways of life. They further said that they showed benevolence to these blacks and coloured people by giving them used clothes occasionally, food during Christmas etc. The Afrikaners did not see the issue in term of justice vs. injustice. But Nick saw the issue through the lens of justice vs. injustice. 

The second episode was when Nick was invited for a Conference on Palestinian rights in 1978. He saw and heard from Palestinian themselves about injustice meted out to them. 

Nick asks two questions in this chapter. First, why can't benevolence substitute for justice? Second, why did certain people look into the same eyes, yet not saw the issue as matter of justice/injustice while others saw it that way. Nick defers the answer to later chapters. 

Psalms 15

In this Psalm, David asks the question who may dwell in God's sanctuary; one who is righteous and just. Then David goes on to provide the answer to his own question, and he says: 

"He whose walk is blameless"; meaning, not one who has not being morally upright at all time, but who might have been morally wrong yet is forgiven and is now not blameworthy, now blameless. He is a person who stands blameless now. 

"and who does what is righteous,

 who speaks the truth from his heart

and does not speak ill of others,

who does his neighbour no wrong

and casts no slur on his fellow human, 

who despises a vile man

but honours those who fear the Yahweh, 

who keeps his word

even when it hurts, 

who lends his money without interest

and does not accept a bribe against the innocent. 

He who does these things

will never be shaken." 

David does think that one who accepts bribery is wrong and does not merit to be in God's sanctuary. Yes, bribery blinds the eye. Bribery takes away the good from the one who deserves and gives it to the one who deserves not, and this why bribery is wrong. 

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 5

Here is chapter 4, where Nick gives a preliminary response to those who argue that justice is virtually absent in the New Testament. In this chapter, Nick argues from the New Testament to demonstrate that justice is very much part of what Jesus teaches and demonstrates; and thus leaves behind a legacy, a command, for his disciples to continue.

But first a brief remark about terminology. In Greek literature, say, Plato's The Republic the Greek term 'dikaiosune' would be consistently translated into English as justice. However, in the Bible it is not consistently translated like that. In the New Testament, which is originally written in common Greek,  the same word 'dikaiosune' is not always translated as 'justice'; it is more often translated as 'righteousness'. For example, as in Matthew 5 & 6 -- Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for dikaiosune (v.6); and Blessed are those who are persecuted for dikaiosune (v.10); Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his dikaiosune (6.33). All these verses have dikaiosune translated as 'righteousness' instead of 'justice'. Why such a difference between New Testament and The Republic, which are both Greek literature? The Septuagint, which is a Greek version of the Hebrew Old Testament, which possibly was translated in the second century BC translates the Hebrew word tsedaqa as dikaiosune and  mishpat as krisis which is more of a legal terminology.  Thus Tsedaqa becomes dikaiosune in Greek and righteousness in English; while mishpat becomes krisis in Greek and justice in English. However, it has to be said that this translation is not 100% accurate, and whether the verse has to be translated as righteousness or justice has to depend on context too. Nick would thus hold that Mat 5.10 should have 'justice' instead of 'righteousness', provided we assume that 'righteousness' is more about moral status of the individual and 'justice' as denoting inter-personal relationship. 

Nick uses NT scholar Richard Hays' commentary to argue for his case. Nick argues that Mary's song in Luke 1 is about anticipation of justice that the Messiah would usher in. Luke 4 where Jesus reads out Isaiah's text and declares the arrival of the promise then and there is about justice -- justice for the poor, the weak and the prisoners. Furthermore, Nick argues that Jesus' ministry includes those who are left out of the society -- the deaf, dumb, blind, paralytics etc. -- besides lifting up those who were at the bottom-- the poor, widows, orphans, aliens, imprisoned. Jesus remakes a society that is inclusive, and this is about justice. 

Does Jesus consider human being to have worth? He does, argues Nick. 'How much more valuable is a human being than a sheep?' asks Jesus, indicating that humans have worth. Furthermore, Jesus says that human is worth more than a sparrow! Nick opines that it seems fair to conclude that Jesus' belief in equal human worth is the reason for showing no partiality between  thosewho are ritually clean and unclean or between those who are rich and poor.

As is the case with any good thinker, to fend off criticism, Nick does hair splitting of his arguments at various points. I am not going into the detail in these posts. Any objection to his arguments should be held back before reading his book. 

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 4

This is chapter 4 and it is titled 'On De-justicizing the New Testament'. Chapter 3 is here. This chapter is more of a polemic, in that Nick challenges what he understood as an attempt by certain thinkers to undermine the idea of justice in the Bible. Nick is not yet advancing the idea that justice is a key theme in the New Testament. Nick is kind to those thinkers he disagrees with. But still he will argue for the point that justice is a central idea in the Bible in the next chapter.

Stanley Haurwas says that justice is a bad idea for Christians. What Nick understood Stanley as saying is that justice has been misused and abused by the larger society and it is beyond redemption. So even if Christians care for the oppressed, the language of justice should not be employed; let it be something else. Nick disagrees!

Another challenge comes from Anders Nygren. Nygren argues that the central idea of the Bible is love; not justice. It is this love of God that results in sending his son Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of human sinfulness. This love, however, is not any other kind of love but gratuitous benevolence or rather agape. Agape is different from other kind of love like eros. Eros kind of love is to enhance one's own well-being; whereas agape kind of love is to enhance the well-being of the other. And this agape is the kind of love found in the Bible. God's forgiveness of human sin is not because he has to demonstrate justice, but because he loves human being. Where love abounds, justice is obsolete. Is Nygren correct in his understanding of the Bible?

Nick answers this question in the next chapter. But in this chapter he takes Nygren's own idea to argue that the idea is not coherent. Nick argues that forgiveness can come about 'only if you have wronged me, and only for the wrong you have done me'. I cannot forgive Godse for what he did to Gandhi. I can forgive for the wrong done to me only. The idea of forgiveness emerges only when one is wronged – when justice is violated. If the concept of justice is not there at all, there can't be anyone who is wronged and there can't be forgiveness. When God forgives me, it is because I have sinned against him; or rather because I have wronged against him, say, by breaking the covenant between he and me. And because I broke the covenant, I need his forgiveness to restore the covenant. Thus, Nygren cannot really speak of love and forgiveness by abolishing the idea of justice. Justice comes as a part and partial of love and forgiveness. The attempt to erase justice from Christian theological enterprise will fail.That's the central idea of Nick in this chapter. 

 

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 2

This is the second chapter of the book, but the third post. The previous post is here. This second chapter is titled 'A Contest of Narratives'.

The right order theorists tell a story that says something to the effect that the idea of subjective right develops with the emergence of political liberalism. (Political liberalism is that strand of political thought that considers rights of an individual as the first virtue a state must protect.) Other writer would trace the source of the idea of subjective/natural right to the writing of Ockham. Now Ockham was a thinker belonging to the Franciscan order. After the death of St. Francis, who had voluntarily chosen a life of poverty, there was a dispute between the Pope and the Franciscan. The Pope was of the opinion that the Franciscan did have some sort of ownership of property. One of the effects of having to give up ownership of everything would mean that the church cannot own anything. Ockham and others went to make a case that it is lawful to give up right to own property, but one cannot renounce the 'natural right' to use properties that may belong to someone. Thus, argue right orders theorists, Ockham invented the idea of subjective right... Nick argues that the idea of such of kind of right goes much older than Ockham and political thinkers like Hobbes and Locke.

Nick counter-argues by saying that the right theorists narrative fail to adequately take into consideration the account of right that was already in use in the works of the jurists in the medieval period and also by the older thinkers. Nick cites research work by different modern writers to make a case that the Roman jurists were using the idea of subjective right in their work, and that those who argue that subjective/natural right emerged in Medieval period did not adequately take into consideration the different ways 'right' was employed For example, those in jurisprudence employed the idea in their work. Going beyond that, Nick also argues that when Ockham, the Medieval thinker, employed the language of right, he was not inventing the idea out of the blue; Christian thinkers (or Church Fathers) who were teaching and writing in the first 500 years were already using that sort of idea. The idea of natural right was unmistakably present in the work of John Chrysostom (347-407) , Ambrose of Milan (337-397) and Basil of Caesarea (329/330-379).

Based on the principle of correlative, a right theorist may accept that if there is natural right then it must imply that there is natural duty. But the difference between a right theorist and right order theorist goes deeper. And here is the difference: Does a person have inherent worth for which she/he possess an inherent right or is right conferred to a person by an entity/someone? Nick argues for the former, and this is something he will go on to develop in the following chapters. But if his argument stands, then the right order theorists argument that rights are conferred by state/law/contract etc, and it is not something that a person possesses as if it's an inherent property will be challenged.

I think Nick was convincing enough in his argument that the idea of subjective/natural right was already in use much before Ockham and others. Yet whether a right order theorists can still accept the idea of inherent right and remain a right order theorist is possible or not is something Nick will try to argue in the following chapters. And whether he is successful or not, the readers will have to wait.

Wolterstorff's Justice: Chapter 1

The first post that introduces the book is here. Nick's book is loaded with finer distinctions between various philosophical opinions, and therefore, it is not easy to summarize the book without cutting out certain points. This indicates the depth of his engagement with the matter, and yet one can get lost too unless one concentrates. This is not a book that you can just relax and read; it requires serious reading! 

Nick provides a preliminary description of right in the introductory chapter. He gives another preliminary description of right in this chapter again. The last paragraph of this post will explain this concept. In this chapter the author explains the difference between the concept of justice  laid out by right order theorists like Plato and his own version which is similar to that of Roman jurist Ulpian.

This is Plato's version of justice given in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato narrates the account of Socrates' dialogues with his friends to obtain concepts of justice for an individual soul as well as for the city. For this blog, I am simplifying Plato's account. To obtain the concept of justice, Plato  begins by asking what the function of a city is. And he says that the function of a city is: to provide  provision, to defend itself and to govern the citizens. Then he goes on to ask how the city would function well. He says a city would function well when there is division of labour (say, a craftsman doing his craft to provide provision; a soldier defending the city; and the king governing the city well) based on natural ability and education. Thus, if there is no mistake in the structural division and educational provided based on one's natural ability, and the different parties function based on their respective ability, it will be a good city, a city that functions well. It will then be a city where justice prevail -- where there is right order. 

In the book, Nick explains Ulpian's version first and then comes to Plato's version. I reverse the order for this blog post. Ulpian writes that justice is a "steady and enduring will to render to each other their ius."  'Ius' is normally translated as 'right', but the word 'right' here needs explanation. For example, because you have promised to pay me Rs. 100 if I work in your garden for two hours, I did work for two hours. Now you refused to pay me. I have the right to be paid. But I am not enjoying my right. The fact that you refused to pay me does not make my right vanish; it's just that I am not enjoying my right. When you pay me, I shall be enjoying my right. Thus, justice prevails when I enjoy my right, when my 'ius' is honoured. When my right is denied, I am wronged by you. You are guilty; and I am wronged. For justice to prevail, I need to enjoy my right. 

The right order theorists argue that rights come about because of legislation, speech acts etc. Whereas Nick argues that rights do come about that way, but there is more to it.  Nick argues that rights also come about because the entity possesses certain property, stand in certain sort of relationship with other entities or perform certain sort of action; they have certain inherent rights. This is the difference between right theorists like Nick and right order theorist like Plato. Thus, the difference basically is, if I may surmise, whether there is any right called inherent right or not. And this (natural) inherent right is not natural right! By natural right, generally it means the conferred natural right, not inherent right. Right order theorists can accept conferred natural right or rather simply natural right, but not inherent right. And Nick is going to defend the idea of inherent right and the concept of justice based on inherent right an individual possesses.

What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Book Review)

Michael Sandel teaches at Harvard University. The course – Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? – that he teaches at Harvard is officially put up on youtube for public views. The same course attracts almost a thousand student each year, making Sandel one of the most popular teachers of his generation. 

 

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 sets binding obligation on industrialised nations to reduce emission of polluting gases. It says that a country can reduce pollution either by reducing emission of polluting gases itself or pay another country to reduce theirs. The second option works this way: US can continue to produce as much pollution as it is provided it pays to replace diesel run buses in India with CNG. After all, the Protocol seems to argue, the effect is just the same: less pollution globally. Let's take another case. Stiffs.com offers “gamblers” a chance to make money by betting on which famous personality will die by year's end. Current “hit list” includes Billy Graham, George Bush Sr., Nelson Mandela, Fidel Castro and others. One may argue that these people are not made worse off when strangers bet on when they will die. Let's take one more case. In 1928 Canada banned walrus hunting except for Inuit whose livelihood depends on that for thousand of years (instead of the term 'Eskimo' which is considered derogatory, 'Inuit' is the politically correct label). In the 1990s Inuit leaders approached Canadian government to sell their right to kill some walrus quota to big-game hunters. The number of walrus killed will remain unchanged; Inuits will get extra money and the hunter their game. The government agreed! 

 

Is the transaction involved in the cases mentioned above morally right or not? Sandel is nonjudgmental on the moral correctness of the several dozens of cases he mentioned. However, he argues that what is right or wrong, what is the good life or what kind of social practices we should prize are some questions we should debate about in public life. Leaving all these questions unaddressed, purely at the mercy of market driven social practices, will render a society virtue-less. Since virtues, generosity or civic spirit grow with use, like human muscles that grow with daily exercise, he asks if maintaining silence on moral and spiritual matters for fear of rival versions competing in the democratic life is healthy. But it is exactly for fear of various moral and spiritual beliefs competing in the democratic market that some people want to keep the subject matter out of the public square.
 

Different cultures practice different moral norms. It was like that in the past; and in the present state of affairs too, that's the case. But does this kind of diversity undermine the whole idea of moral progress? Can we say a culture that practises infanticide is as morally right as a culture that forbids this practice, ceteris paribus. Was it a mistake to abolish burning of widow or slavery because people then thought that such practices were bad? No. They did the right thing. But if they did the right thing then morality is not really relative; or is it? If the idea of moral progress is not a myth then we need to debate moral matters in public square. Unless we do that there cannot be moral progress as a society. Even today some cultures cut off the hand of the thief; some cultures expel couple of same sex; some cultures abort foetus. How must the state respond to the different practices: forget about this matters or debate about them? It's not just economic matters but other ethical inquiries that require debate in the public square, more so in the university settings. Kicking religion and morality out of public square will create an even bigger moral and spiritual vacuum in the political space. 

 

Let me also borrow a line of argument from the book and apply in another setting. In Senapati town and adjoining areas, those who are in a desperate situation borrow money from private lenders at the rate of 60% per year. Sometimes the rate may reach 90% or 120% or even upto 150% per year, depending on how desperate a situation one is in. Proponents of free-market economy would argue that demand and supply matrix engenders such a state of affairs. None compels a person to borrow; the borrowers take loan from the private lenders at his own free will. Based on the demand, supply at such rate flourishes. But one may raise two objections here to such an argument: the fairness argument and the corruption argument. Those who borrow money at such a high interest rate are in a desperate economic situation. Many a times it is for urgent medical care. Charging high interest rate in such a situation is taking advantage of someone's helplessness. So it is not fair (This is the fairness argument). The other argument is that it is a duty of each person to help one another; even the private lenders would agree that the lending of money is to help the needy person, not to exploit him or add more misery to his woes or for profit motive alone. And when interest rate is just so high, the primary concept of lending money to help the needy ones is damaged (This is the corruption argument). 

 

Should we let free-market economy have its way or should we say money can't just buy off one's responsibility, one's duty? May we say that US ought not to trade off its civic responsibility with money? Or in the case of gambling can we say even if one does no harm to someone physically, it is not right to gamble on someone's life – waiting for him to die so that I get paid! Or is this a morally neutral ground that moral and political philosophy/theology must not get into? In this book and in the international bestseller Justice: What's the Right Thing to do? Michael Sandel probes subject matters that sit on the edge of ethics and political economy. With his many real life illustrations and stories, he brings out the moral questions and complexities of human affairs. Sandel is easy to digest yet profound!

Justice and Christianity

In her interview on a programme of Hastings College of the Law, University of California, Martha Nussbaum says, "Christianity as I was experiencing it was a religion about 'let's take advantage of our privileges in this life, and let justice wait for the world to come.'" In the same interview she says that it was the concern for justice that made her convert to Judaism. Nussbaum is at present one of the most prominent philosophers in the area of moral and political philosophy and teaches at University of Chicago. I have read some of her writings and I agree on quite a lot of things that  she says and writes. In the interview mentioned above she did not say that Christianity is so and so; she rather said that Christianity was so and so as she was experiencing it. And it was not her fault that she came across that version of Christianity.

But is the version of Christianity that she experienced the authentic version of Christianity? I would argue that it is not. But I would also concede that such version of Christianity is not uncommon. One just have to surf Christian bookstore for a while to know about such version. As a religion that is found in all the continents, practised by people of every conceivable social position, the Bible has different ways of being read and interpreted. This different interpretation does not mean that all the interpretations are correct and authentic. Some are very wrong, so distant from what the Bible teaches; and some are right. One just have to read the Bible to know which is what. 

The book that the Jewish considers sacred is considered to be sacred by the Christians too. So if Judaism considers justice as an important virtue, Christianity cannot but considers it equally important, if not more. The God in the Old Testament or the Hebrew Bible is just the same as the God in the New Testament. The main different is that in the New Testament Jesus Christ is here revealed as the incarnate of the God of the Old Testament. This Jesus Christ himself faced injustice unto death; but through death he took on the power of the evil one and exhaust its power on the cross to emerge triumphant on the third day. And having conquered the evil one through death and resurrection, he now gives power to his disciples and commissions them to go out into the world " to preach good news unto the poor; to heal the contrite of heart; to proclaim liberty to the captives; and deliverance to them that are shut up".

It was because of his conviction that all men are equal as taught in the Bible he read that William Wilberforce laboured for over 20 years for the Abolition of slavery  in the British empire. It was because of his concern for social justice that Martin Luther King Jr.,  the Christian minister, strived hard for Civil Right movement in the US. Christians have this strong conviction about the world to come. But this strong conviction is never to lead away Christians to engage in this world for justice. Towards the end of his longest discourse on the life to come, St. Paul writes, " therefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord knowing that your labour is not in vain..." ( 1 Cor 15: 58). Justice and peace are what Christian believers are to work and to pray for in this world. Working for justice and peacemaking are not optionals; they are part and parcel of being a follower of Jesus Christ.

Is it ever Justifiable to Steal?

I believe that the God revealed in the Bible is the creator of the world. And he has created the world in such a way that the material goods will be distributed without anyone having to starve. We human, however, distort and corrupt this plan of God through our greed and hate repeatedly. And so when some powerful people gather riches leaving the widows and orphans starving and naked, this is against the will of God. When even the basic needs of some people are not met, it is normally because the material goods have not been shared appropriately as some people refuse to follow God's plan of distributive justice. If the rich follows God's word, the hungry and the naked would no longer remain in that condition.

Listen to what some older Christians said. In his book Justice: Right and Wrong, Nicholas Wolterstorff made this quote of Basil of Caesarea (329-379) "that bread which you keep, belongs to the hungry; that coat which you preserve in your wardrobe, to the naked; those shoes which are rotting in your possession, to the shoeless; that gold which you have hidden in the ground, to the needy. Wherefore, as often as you were able to help others, and refused, so often did you do them wrongs" ¹ In the same page, Wolterstorff quoted Bishop Ambrose of Milan (339-397) “Not from you own do you bestow upon the poor man, but you make return from what is his”. Vinoth Ramachandra, in his book Gods That Fail: Modern Idolatary and Christian Mission, writes quoting John Chrysostom ( 347-407) “ This also is theft, not to share one's possession... For his own goods are not his own, but belong to his own fellow servants...I beg you remember this without fail, that not to share our own wealth with the poor is theft from the poor and deprivation of their means of life; we do not possess our own wealth but theirs.” ² This lines are clear that when some rich people store riches, and left, say, the widows and orphans starving and naked the rich are actually keeping which don't belong to themselves. And this is the way Christians of old understood with respect to the way material goods are to be distributed.

Vinoth Ramachandra continues in the same book “ It is morally permissible for an extremely impoverished person to take what he or she needs for sustenance from a person who has plenty. If I have food in my house which you need for our survival, but which is not indispensable for mine, then it rightfully belongs to you, it would not be an act of charity on it. If I offered it to you, it would not be an act of charity on my part as much as granting you your own rights under God.” Then Vinoth goes on to quote Thomas Aquinas ( 1225-1274), the great medieval theologian, “ In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for need has made it common... Now according to the natural order established by Divine providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succouring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law do not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law to the purpose of succouring the poor."  Vinoth continued “ Reasoning from the principle of stewardship whereby material things are seen as held in trust for the common welfare, Aquinas continued: ' Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succour his own need by means of another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft nor robbery' ”. ³

I need not add further word. But from the explanation given above I believe it is justifiable that there is a certain kind of situation when it is morally permissible to take what belongs to others or rather what actually belongs to me but in others' custody.

The moral of the point is that the rich people owe so much to the poor.

1. Wolterstorff, Nicholas (2008). Justice: Rights and Wrongs, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 62
2. Ramachandra, Vinoth ( 1996). Gods That Fail: Modern Idolatary and Christian Mission, Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, p. 45
3. Ibid., p. 46

Is it fair to treat certain members of a society unequally?

Does the idea of justice demand that we treat certain members of the society unequally?

The society in which we live is not a fair or just one. Many people die of exposure to cold in winter as they sleep under the bridge. And in summer many people die of dehydration. It is the those living in the slums whose house get bulldozed and who face power cut more often than the rest though everyone pays the electricity. The poor thus have to manage without a fan in summer so that the rich could run their AC. The poor in the slums are so often denied ration card and they struggle to get it made as the officials are not helpful. But when the rich appears they get it made easily...for various reasons! The poor people also don't have sufficient to eat and so their children too grow up facing such shortage. The children often failed to go to school and so in their later life cannot compete with the rest. Even if they go to school they go to Government run schools the facilities would be so poor. And it is because of such poor facility that the rich don't send their children to these schools. In sickness the poor suffers, and when some lethal sickness strikes they are oftentime unable to get out of it. Or even if they did get out, all their resources would have been drained.

Privileges and resources are unequally distributed. Hardship and suffering are not equally distributed in the society. The poor face injustice in their social relations so much more than the rich and the powerful. They are unable to fight for their case; they don't know all the legal systems. They are treated with less respect.

It is good that if everybody's capability could be developed. However, if there is resources crunch, the poor must get the preference over the rich to be developed. The poor has to be brought up the level of the rich. If distributive system is unequal and therefore unequal distribution of resources and hardship result, then rectifying justice must entail that more resources be channeled to those who face more injustice more.

Just distribution entails that we have to distribute resources unequally specially in the light of the practical resources constraint that we experience.

Key Idea in Amartya Sen's Theory of Justice

Substantive freedom is the capability of a person to choose life form one has reason to value. Or put it differently, substantive freedom is the capability of a person to choose various lifestyle that she has reason to value. Maximising substantive freedom serves as the foundation for Amartya Sen's theory of justice. Injustice, thus, is unfreedom that restricts a person from choosing life form that she has reason to value.

For example, a rich man who fasts to give his meal to a poor man is in a different condition than a poor man who fasts because he has nothing to eat. The rich man here has freedom to eat or not to eat; whereas the poor man does not have that freedom. For Sen, justice would then mean providing mechanism/opportunity so that the poor man too would have the kind of freedom like the rich man.

His book Development as Freedom has very useful practical means to enhance justice. He argues for democracy, not least because democracy as opposed to totalitarian regime is good in itself but because such political arrangement compels political leaders to be accountable to the people. He also argues for the upliftment of women and importance of public reasoning. All such implications are important features he cogently argued for.

One of the flaws, I see, in setting substantive freedom as the foundation for theory of justice is that those individuals who cannot make choices are not included in the scope of the theory. There are human persons because of sickness or from birth who cannot make choices. But since they are also human person, one needs to be inclusive and not just bracketed them out. Thus for a theory of justice to be viable one must have an intellectually robust viewpoint of who a human person is. John Rawls in the opening page of his book A Theory of Justice underlines that each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot orveride. The problem with Sen's theory is that once there is an intellectual loophole, the next generation will live it out in flesh: bad or good. And I fear Prof. Sen does not intellectually protect that flank which a mad political leader or a scientist can perform some bizarre act on those who cannot make choices.

But I must mention that I have high respect for Prof. Sen specially the kind of humility and sincerity he exercises in putting forth his arguments. His books have sharpen my thinking in many respects.

Nicholas Wolterstorff on Seeking Justice in Hope

Hope is different from optimism – optimism being understood as the expectation that one will achieve that one endeavors for. An ambulance attendent who attempts to resuscitate a person may not expect to succeed in his effort. Yet as long as she sees some hope, she attempts. If she thinks there is no hope, she gives up and stops trying. Working for justice does not require optimism; it is hope that is required!

Whether it is God's calling of Moses from the burning bush or Zechariah's song of deliverance upon the birth of his John (the Baptist), the sub-narratives are not about hope for consummation at the end of eschaton; they are hope for deliverance in space and time. In the Scripture one can see three strands of theological anthropology – “ there is the story line of how God relates to all that is not God as creator and sustainer, there is the story line of how God relates to all that is not God as consumator, and there is the story line of how God relates to all that is not God as deliverer or redeemer.” And for Moses, God was to deliver from affliction and suffering, and for Zechariah enemies. It is, if we differently word, to be delivered from being wronged.

“What is it to be wronged? It is to fail to receive or enjoy what is due one. It is not to fail to receive or enjoy what one would like, nor to fail to receive or enjoy what would be good for one... One is wronged only when one is deprived of some good to which one has a right... Injustice occurs when someone is deprived of some good that is due him or her – that is, when a person is wronged, when that person is deprived of something to which he or she has a right. Conversely, justice is present in some community insofar as its members enjoy those goods that are due them, to which they have a right. Justice is present when no one is being wronged.”

From the biblical story line of redemption, one can distinguish “doing justice” and “seeking justice”. Doing justice will mean not wronging a person; of not violating her right, and not being responsible of a person not enjoying what is due her. Seeking justice will mean working in a situation to alter or rectify someone's situation so that it is no longer a situation of injustice. In 1 Cor 15.24, St. Pauls say that after every (corrupt and competing) rule and authority and power have been destroyed, will Christ deliver the kingdom to God. Given the Old Testament background, say Ps 72, “Paul's implicit thought must be that there are two kinds of kingship, the kind that consists in the administration of a polity in which there is no justice, and the kind that consists in struggling to overcome the injustice present in the polity. Christ's kingship is of the latter sort.” Christ will conquer injustice – seeking justice, and the Father will reign – doing justice. Followers of Jesus do hope for justice because it is Christ's cause.

Christians hope for liberating justice ( as one seeks justice) will take the form of prayer too, among other things. And this prayer must include naming injustice, and then to pray for the undoing of the injustice named. And when the named injustice is undone, Christians hope will then offer prayer of thanksgiving. This prayer of thanksgiving for undoing the injustice identifies thus the signs of Christ liberating work in history.

Christians hope is grounded in the promise that He will bring his just and holy kingdom. “But then we learn that God moves in mysterious ways, sometimes bringing our best effort to naught, sometimes wresting liberation out of appalling evil.” So does it really matter because God is going to anyhow do it in his own time and sovereign will? Well, just obey him. No matter what, obey. For He would much rather have you and I try our best than have you and I just slack off. What you and I do today matter for His work! 

( This is a summary of an essay by Prof. Wolterstorff in the book The FUTURE of HOPE, Eds Miroslva Volf and William Katerberg, Eerdmans, Cambridge UK, 2004, pp 77-100. Other contributors include John Milbank, Jurgen Moltmann et al. )