Chapter 2 of Rawls' Political Liberalism

This is a summarisation of chapter 2 of Rawls' Political Liberalism.

Chapter 2 of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism discusses the concept of a political conception of justice, and how it differs from comprehensive moral doctrine. Rawls argues that a political conception is limited to the basic structure of society and focuses on principles that can be reasonably acceptable to citizens who have different comprehensive views. Given that comprehensive views have scope so large that they extend far beyond the political conception, he avoids using comprehensive moral doctrine. Critics have underlined that in his A Theory of Justice, he had employed a comprehensive moral doctrine. To rectify this point, he was careful to avoid that the political conception that he attempts to arrive at is rather limited one in term of the scope that it covers. He also discusses the idea of an overlapping consensus where citizens can come to agree on certain principles of justice even if they have different comprehensive beliefs. Rawls concludes the chapter by stating that a political conception of justice should aim to ensure basic liberties and equality of basic rights and opportunities, while respecting the diversity of citizens’ comprehensive beliefs. 

Chapter 3 is here.